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Abstract
Background: Lagos state is the industrial nerve centre of Nigeria and was the epicentre of the 2014 Ebola outbreak
in Nigeria as it is now for the current Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) outbreak. This paper describes how the
lessons learned from the Ebola outbreak in 2014 informed the emergency preparedness of the State ahead of the
COVID-19 outbreak and guided response.
Discussion: Following the Ebola outbreak in 2014, the Lagos State government provided governance by
developing a policy on emergency preparedness and biosecurity and provided oversight and coordination of
emergency preparedness strategies. Capacities for emergency response were strengthened by training key staff,
developing a robust surveillance system, and setting up a Biosafety Level 3 laboratory and biobank. Resource
provision, in terms of finances and trained personnel for emergencies was prioritized by the government. With the
onset of COVID-19, Lagos state was able to respond promptly to the outbreak using the centralized Incident
Command Structure and the key activities of the Emergency Operations Centre. Contributory to effective response
were partnerships with the private sectors, community engagement and political commitment.
Conclusion: Using the lessons learned from the 2014 Ebola outbreak, Lagos State had gradually prepared its
healthcare system for a pandemic such as COVID-19. The State needs to continue to expand its preparedness to be
more resilient and future proof to respond to disease outbreaks. Looking beyond intra-state gains, lessons and
identified best practices from the past and present should be shared with other states and countries.
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Background
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, there have
been some notable pandemics including the 1918 ‘Span-
ish’ Flu caused by an influenza A(H1N1) virus, 1957 in-
fluenza A (H2N2) virus, 1968 influenza A (H3N2) virus,
2002 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) caused
by SARS coronavirus, and the 2009 Swine Flu caused by
an influenza A(H1N1) virus [1, 2]. While not declared a
pandemic in itself, the West African Ebola Virus Disease
(EVD) epidemic between 2013 and 2016 was an out-
break with huge regional significance, claiming an esti-
mated 11,300 lives in total [3]. In December 2019, the
Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) caused by infection
with the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Corona-
virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) emerged in Wuhan city, China,
and since then there has been a global spread of the dis-
ease to pandemic proportions [4]. The first documented
case of COVID-19 in Africa was reported on 14th Feb-
ruary, 2020 in Egypt, followed by Algeria on 25th Febru-
ary, 2020, and Nigeria on 27th February, 2020 [5, 6].
This first case in Nigeria was an Italian citizen who flew
into the commercial city of Lagos from Milan. By 11th
March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO)
had declared the COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic [7].
Now, it is well established that the disease is transmitted
via respiratory droplets and close prolonged personal
contact with infected persons or surfaces with the virus
[8]. As of 5th July 2021, over 183 million cases had been
confirmed, including almost four million deaths globally.
The African continent accounts for 2.3% of confirmed
COVID-19 cases and about 2.5% of deaths reported
worldwide [9].
Lagos state, located in the southwestern region of
Nigeria and the industrial nerve centre of the country,
has been the epicentre of the COVID-19 pandemic in
the country, similarly as it was for the EVD outbreak in
2014 [10, 11]. With a population of about 21 million, it
is classed as a megacity and has the highest population
density in Africa [12, 13]. Lagos was the entry point of
the index case of EVD and thus there were already con-
cerns about the entry of COVID-19 into Lagos before it
was declared a pandemic and the State’s capacity for re-
sponse [14]. Measures to manage the outbreak of a novel
disease such as COVID-19 are reliant on a State’s exist-
ing operational readiness and capacities to prevent, de-
tect and respond to public health emergencies [15].
As has already been well established, many of the
emerging epidemic and pandemic threats that confront
humanity have a zoonotic origin [16]. The timing of
these threats might be difficult to predict but their emer-
gence at some point in time is guaranteed. As such, any
plans to mitigate such threats need to be robust and
‘ready-to-go’. The WHO defines emergency prepared-
ness as “the knowledge, capacities and organizational
systems developed by governments, response and recov-
ery organizations, communities and individuals to effect-
ively anticipate, respond to, and recover from the
impacts of likely, imminent, emerging, or current emer-
gencies” [17]. This article describes the efforts of Lagos
State in developing a preparedness and response plan
based on lessons learnt from the 2014 EVD outbreak
and the deployment of this plan ahead of the COVID-19
outbreak in the state. The article then critically analyses
this plan and the corresponding response using the
WHO’s Strategic Framework for Emergency Prepared-
ness which highlights governance, capacities, and re-
sources as the elements of emergency preparedness [16].
Lagos State’s implementation approach for
emergency preparedness
This section maps the key events that occurred between
the emergence of EVD and that of COVID-19 along
with implementation actions of the Lagos State Govern-
ment during this period (Fig. 1). The section describes
these actions in line with the three key elements of
emergency preparedness, as recognized (governance,
capacities, and resources) along with their sub-
components [16].
Governance
a. Policies and legislation that integrate emergency
preparedness
Following the EVD outbreak in 2014, there was a clear
need for Lagos state to develop a preparedness plan to
be activated in the instance of any future outbreaks. A
committee named State Ebola Viral Disease Research
Initiative (SEVDRI) was established in November 2014.
SEVDRI was mandated to conceptualise an emergency
preparedness framework aimed at increasing the State’s
resilience and capacity to respond to biological and
other public health threats. The committee working as
technical partner with Global Emerging Pathogen Treat-
ment (GET) Consortium, an international collaboration
developed during the EVD outbreak to ensure that sub-
Saharan Africa was prepared for any public health emer-
gency of international concern by providing strategic
recommendations and establishing infrastructure and re-
search capacity [18], concluded that in addition to ro-
bust public health and surveillance systems, there was a
need for policies and guidelines specific to biobanking
and biosecurity in Lagos State. On the one hand, bio-
banking refers to the collection of biological material
and the associated data and information stored in an or-
ganized system for a population and is critical to gain
better understanding of emerging and their pathogens
[19, 20]. On the other hand, biosecurity is a strategic
and integrated approach to analyse and manage relevant
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risks to human, animal and plant life and health and as-
sociated risks for the environment [21].
A rapid review of the extant laws, policies, and regula-
tions in the state was therefore conducted. The review
was interested in any law or policy concerning the do-
mestication of elements by virtue of Nigeria being signa-
tory or aligned with the International Health Regulations
[IHR (2005)], Practices of Veterinary Services, the Bio-
logical Weapons Convention, the United Nations Secur-
ity Council resolution 1540 and the Global Health
Security Agenda. This task was approached with the
mindset to propose and request amendments to current
legislative acts relevant to biosecurity, if applicable, and
to guide the development of a standalone emergency
preparedness, biosecurity and biobanking bill. The re-
view showed that at the time there were no current pol-
icies or legislation that could support emergency
preparedness, biobanking or the threats that modern
biotechnology pose to global health security such as the
development, production, stockpiling, or use of bio-
logical weapons.
Subsequently, SEVDRI metamorphosed into Biosafety,
Biobanking, Biosecurity and Biocontainment (B4) com-
mittee with an expanded and multi-pronged approach
to: (a) work with the Lagos State legislature to identify
gaps in legislation relating to emergency preparedness,
biobanking and biosecurity in the state; (b) establish a
framework and strategy for implementing biobanking
and biosecurity in Lagos State with respect to prepared-
ness and rapid response, referred to as the Lagos State
Biosecurity and Biothreat reduction road map; and (c)
establish the Lagos State Biosecurity and Biobanking
Governance Council (LSBBGC), an entity mandated to
constitute itself with diverse range of expertise whose
sole responsibility is to assist the state to protect its bio-
logical space to ensure that it is healthy whilst also en-
suring that knowledge that is derivable from it is
sovereign and protected. This LSBBGC was set up to fa-
cilitate a scale-up of emergency preparedness against
emerging infectious diseases [22]. The 12-member com-
mittee includes experts in bio-banking, biosecurity, mo-
lecular biology, public health, ethics, security, law,
anthropology, environment, agriculture and representa-
tives of the civil society [22].
Furthermore, the B4 committee drew up a draft policy
on emergency preparedness, biobanking and biosecurity
which went through several stakeholder engagements
and was reviewed and validated by the LSBBGC and the
relevant stakeholder ministries. This process was facili-
tated by the GET Consortium, an African-led multidis-
ciplinary team of experts who are consultants to the
Lagos State Government (LASG) on Biosecurity issues
[18]. The policy built on existing State public health in-
frastructure such as the Lagos State Emergency Manage-
ment Agency, Lagos State Ambulance Service, Lagos
State Waste Management Authority, Lagos Mainland
Fig. 1 Timeline of Lagos State’s epidemic preparedness following the 2014 EVD outbreak
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Infectious Disease Hospital (IDH), State Environmental
Health Monitoring Unit and the Integrated Disease Sur-
veillance and Response (IDSR) system at both the State
and Local Government levels for routine surveillance
and notification. Lagos State completed the five-year
Biosecurity policy and roadmap in 2018 (Fig. 1). The
revamped policy also leveraged experience garnered in
tackling previous emergencies and epidemics [23]. For
example, during the 2014 EVD outbreak, the state had
set up its Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) which
had six units focused on epidemiology and surveillance,
communication and social mobilisation, case manage-
ment and infection prevention control (IPC), laboratory
services, point of entry (port health), and management
and coordination [24]. These six units were subsequently
expanded to nine units, making case management a sep-
arate unit from IPC and adding logistics and supply (in-
cluding deployment of PPEs) as well as research (Fig. 2).
b. Plans for emergency preparedness, response and
recovery
The EVD research committee that was set up during
the EVD response was integrated into the B4 commit-
tee with the responsibility of overseeing the establish-
ment of the emergency preparedness infrastructure,
the Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) laboratory and the bio-
bank facility, now referred to as the Lagos State Bio-
bank (Fig. 1). The establishment of the biobank was
supported by the LASG and the Government of
Canada. As a unit, it has the only functional BSL-3
laboratory in Nigeria and it is the only energy mix
hybrid biobank in West Africa, with its use of solar
power as its primary source of energy deemed to be
environmentally friendly [25, 26]. The biobank has a
staff strength of 12 people including an infectious dis-
ease specialist (virologist), a director, a quality assur-
ance manager, information technology (IT) staff, and
a risk assessment officer. These staff make up the
core of the Biobanking and Biosecurity Team (BBT),
which is technically supported by the GET Consor-
tium [18].
Advocacy continued following the 2014 EVD outbreak
and significant investments were made in rapidly institu-
tionalising emerging infection, prevention, and control
procedures including the establishment of standard op-
erating procedures on the use of Personal Protective
Equipment (PPE), activation of collaboration protocols
with the Federal Ministry of Health’s Port Health Ser-
vices for screening persons arriving in Lagos via its land,
sea, and air borders. The state’s Ministry of Health also
designated the IDH as the referral facility for suspected
or confirmed cases of any emerging infectious disease.
In addition, the government directed all public health fa-
cilities to set up a dedicated isolation ward for suspected
cases of Ebola and Lassa fever (the infectious disease of
concern at the time), and to provide healthcare workers
with a buffer stock of PPE [23].
c. Coordination mechanisms
The LSBBGC was tasked with providing oversight and
coordination of the different strategies for biosecurity.
This council has decision-making responsibilities for
both technical and governance issues throughout the
process of advancing the emergency preparedness and
biosecurity program. The council went through a year-
Fig. 2 Units of Lagos State’s Emergency Operations Centre
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long orientation in 2018. This was seen as a critical ac-
tivity and a key pillar to the long-term success of the
Lagos State emergency preparedness and biosecurity
framework.
The LASG via the Directorate of Epidemiology, Biose-
curity and Global Health, inaugurated the Epidemic Pre-
paredness and Response (EPR) committees and Rapid
Response Teams (RRT) in each local government area
(LGA) of the state. The EPR committee in each LGA
was given the mandate to develop and oversee the im-
plementation of emergency preparedness strategies, ac-
tion plans and procedures [27]. This committee
consisted of the LGA health team and the manager of
the local government council. The LGA health team in-
cluded the Medical Officer of Health, apex chief nursing
office, apex community health officer, apex monitoring
and evaluation officer and assistant, disease surveillance
and notification officer (DSNO) and assistant, and the
local immunisation officer.
The RRT is a technical and multi-disciplinary team
that is readily available for quick mobilisation and de-
ployment in cases of emergencies in line with guidelines
of the Federal Ministry of Health [27]. In each LGA,
members of the team included the LGA chairman, the
head of the community development committee, one
divisional police officer, the head of the neighbourhood
security commission, the head of works and housing,
and all members of the LGA health team.
Capacities
a. Assessments of risks and capacities to determine
priorities for emergency preparedness
Following the successful management of the 2014
EVD outbreak, LASG commenced the process of in-
creasing its capacity to manage and contain future
biosecurity threats. Between 2015 and 2020, LASG in
collaboration with GET consortium, convened five
biosecurity conferences across the sub-region of West
Africa and trained its key staff in biosecurity and bio-
threat reduction (Fig. 1) [28].
The LSBBGC and the BBT also set out to ensure that
the Lagos State biobank met international standards.
This was achieved by benchmarking the Lagos State bio-
bank with the biobank in the University of Stellenbosch,
South Africa, using all the governance mechanisms
already established by collaborating consortia on genom-
ics and bioinformatics: H3Africa, B3Africa and GET
Consortia [29, 30].
Additionally, a risk assessment plan was developed
using a One Health approach [23, 31]. Supported by the
WHO, the emergency preparedness team carried out
routine risk assessment by checking for microbiological
organisms in water bodies.
b. Surveillance, early warning and information
management
In 2014, the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC)
and the Lagos State Ministry of Health (LSMOH) estab-
lished an Incident Management Centre (IMC) in Lagos
State. This IMC was the implementing arm of the na-
tional response to EVD and was renamed as the Na-
tional EOC in the same year. The EOC took an incident
management approach to identify and rapidly respond
to threats of disease outbreaks [10]. It is a central point
of assembly and coordination for response activities dur-
ing public health events [17]. The EOC in Lagos State
was the forerunner of the 20 EOCs in Nigeria as of year
2019 [23].
Additionally, a more robust surveillance system was
developed where each LGA has DSNOs who meet every
month to report on surveillance activities in their LGAs.
These meetings, funded by the LASG and supported by
the WHO, also provided an opportunity to discuss the
challenges with the surveillance and reporting systems.
c. Access to diagnostic services during emergencies
The LASG pioneered laboratory biosecurity efforts in
Nigeria by being the first state in the country to design
and construct a BSL-3 laboratory. This lab has the cap-
acity to run 1500 PCR tests daily and is building genom-
ics and bioinformatics capacity [32].
Resources
a. Financial resources for emergency preparedness and
contingency funding for response
The state has adequately funded both the emergency
preparedness activities and the biobanking agenda. This
funding has supported several capacity building sessions,
infrastructural upgrades, regular meetings, and a strong
surveillance and reporting structure. Funding for pre-
paredness efforts was also sourced from foreign govern-
ments and agencies. For example, the biobank which
was delivered through a partnership between LASG and
the Canadian government, through its Global Partner-
ship Program (GPP), which contributed to the US$4.5
million project [33].
b. Dedicated, trained and equipped human resources for
emergencies
Since the 2014 EVD outbreak, several LSMOH staff have
attended workshops and certification trainings on emer-
gency preparedness, biosafety, biosecurity, infection pre-
vention and control, data governance, and sample
governance. These trainings were conducted by GET
Consortium, WHO, Public Health England, South Afri-
can National Biodiversity Institute, Stellenbosch Univer-
sity, and Western Cape University.
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Outcome of Lagos’ emergency preparedness plan
in the wake of COVID-19
COVID-19 response plan
Lagos State articulated a COVID-19 Response Plan in
June 2020 that identified and described the systems, ac-
tivities, resources, and timelines required to combat the
COVID-19 pandemic at the State and LGAs. The re-
sponse plan builds on the existing capacities created by
the responses to recent outbreaks in the State, taking
into account lessons learnt from those previous out-
breaks while not being oblivious to the peculiarity of the
current threat.
The COVID-19 response plan is being implemented
by the EOC. Four weeks before the index case, Lagos
state set-up an Incident Command System (ICS), the
body responsible for defining the strategic direction of
the State’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The
ICS is led by the Governor of Lagos State who serves as
the Incident Commander, assisted by the state’s Com-
missioner for Health. The EOC is actively supported by
local (NCDC) and international partners (WHO) who
assist the operational pillars with their experience and
capacity. The ICS is organized into six thematic areas:
Advocacy and stakeholder management; Research and
manuscripts; Incident Manager; Strategy and reporting;
Supply chain management and Operations (Fig. 3) [21].
Role of the think tank of the Lagos state incidence
command system
As part of response to COVID-19, the Governor and In-
cident Commander created a COVID-19 Think Tank
(Fig. 3). This was a human resource strategy involving a
multidisciplinary team of subject matter experts who
continuously interrogate the entire response direction
and provide continuous guidance to the State on process
improvement. The Think Tank facilitates timely decision
making, dissemination of information to the govern-
ment, the media, interest groups involved in the public
policy process as well as the public. It is a dynamic team
which includes experts in governance, research, health
management information systems, donor engagement,
technical assistance, infection prevention and control,
psychosocial interventions, public relations, and commu-
nications. The guidance they provide are in broad areas
of coordination and project management, strategy, clin-
ical governance, research, communication, and logistics.
Response activities
Mobilisation of resources and responses was made easier
because of the ICS was already in place before the first
case of COVID-19 in Lagos/Nigeria. For instance, the
diagnosis of the first COVID-19 case in Lagos/Nigeria
was made within six hours of arrival at IDH compared
to three days to make the diagnosis of the first EVD case
in 2014 [28]. This first case was a 44-year-old man who
flew into Lagos 24th February 2020 on a Turkish Airline
flight from Milan. The man stayed at a hotel near the
airport the night he arrived and was driven to his work-
place at Ewekoro, Ogun state, which shares a boundary
with Lagos state, the day after. He felt ill after two days
and reported at a clinic [34].
The EOC was activated immediately at the State and
at LGA levels, to ensure the grassroots penetration of all
activities being carried out in response to the threat. All
the activities were in alignment with guidelines issued by
the National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC). These
Fig. 3 Structure of the Lagos State Incidence command system
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measures along with outcomes achieved between Febru-
ary and May 2020 are presented below:
i. Point of entry: there were screening of passengers
at the airports, seaports, and land borders using
temperature checks and enquiry about COVID-19
symptoms; infection prevention and control training
for point of entry staff of distribution of IEC mate-
rials to staff, stakeholders, and passengers.
ii. Risk communication: this included sensitization
meetings with the private sector, religious
organizations, stakeholders in the educational
sector, informal sector, and government agencies &
parastatals. In addition, several trainings and
capacity building were carried out. The trainings
were targeted at market men and women, youth
organisations, social mobilization committees, ward
health committees, head teachers and principals,
community-based organisations, artisans, faith-
based organisations and traditional birth attendants.
Between February and May 2020, focus group dis-
cussions (FGDs) were held across the 376 wards in
the state with ten representatives in each ward. The
result of the FGDs was used to refine the content of
the various risk communication messages that had
been produced. Market and motor park
sensitization events were held in 125 markets and
25 motor parks across 20 LGAs and 37 LCDAs.
There were also several press appearances on major
television stations in local languages.
iii. Surveillance and epidemiology: Four hundred
DSNOs were trained on case definition, active
surveillance, contact tracing, case investigation and
other reporting tools. Also, contacts of confirmed
cases were traced, identified, and monitored for the
period of the longest known incubation period of
the virus. Active case search for COVID-19 was
done across the whole state in which samples were
collected from community residents that fit the case
definition for suspected cases and 24 LGA walk-in
sample collection sites were set up across the state
to scale-up testing for COVID-19. During the
period, 22,000 passengers onboard a flight with a
COVID-19 confirmed case and 432 returnees were
followed up across the State. Also, 3,200 persons
who are contacts of confirmed cases were traced,
identified and monitored for the period of the lon-
gest known incubation period of the virus. In
addition, 241 health workers were identified and in-
vestigated for exposure to COVID-19.
iv. IPC: Sixteen IPC SOPs and guidelines developed
and disseminated to relevant stakeholders. Clinical
and non-clinical personnel were trained on IPC
protocols and tracked for health care workers
infection. Also, public and private health facilities
have been assessed across the state for COVID-19
preparedness. During the period, 2972 personnel
were trained (694 non-clinical, 2278 clinical) on
IPC protocols.
v. Logistics: A supply chain strategy was developed,
which outlined the flow of commodity and
information, warehousing and distribution
arrangement, Human resource as well as steps for
emergency procurement. Also, a data management
plan was developed to inform decision making on
the replenishment and procurement of critical and
essential commodities for the COVID-19 response.
Furthermore, the Logistics Management Informa-
tion System, Combined Daily Stock Status Dash-
board, Emergency Procurement Process and
COVID-19 supply chain were developed.
vi. Laboratory services: The State enhanced its capacity
to provide laboratory support for the diagnosis of
COVID-19 by improving the testing capacity of its
laboratories from 180 samples at the beginning of
the outbreak to 2000 samples a day across six la-
boratories including Lagos State Biobank and
54gene laboratory three months later. In particular,
the Lagos State Biobank, a BSL-3 Laboratory, which
was activated for COVID-19 testing in April 2020
[32], became pivotal to COVID-19 diagnosis in the
state being responsible for 60% PCR-testing for
COVID-19 diagnosis. Additional human resources
were recruited and trained to support the activities
of the laboratories across the State, ensuring that
they can provide 24-h services. Also, standard oper-
ating procedures and job aid were developed to
standardise procedures across all laboratories in the
State.
vii. Case management: The political support and
leadership from the government resulted in a
favourable climate for public–private partnership
with some banks and private organizations, which
led to the construction and equipping of isolation
centres in a short amount of time as well as supply
and distribution of personal protective equipment
to health facilities [28]. In doing this, the state was
able to increase the number of its isolation centres
from one to six and from 115 beds at the IDH to a
total of 590 beds.
Budget to achieve these measures were drawn quar-
terly to cater for the uncertainty associated with the
ever-changing COVID-19 pandemic. For the second
quarter (May–July 2020), a budget of N10.8 billion
(US$28.7 million) was estimated to actualise this inci-
dent action plan. The major costs were allocated tor case
management (N5.1 billion (US$13.3 million)), laboratory
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services (N1.6 billion (US$4.2 million)) and human re-
sources (N1.5 billion (US$4.0 million)) [28].
Appraising implementation of the state’s
emergency preparedness and response
As of 17th May 2021, Lagos has reported 58,713 labora-
tory confirmed cases of COVID-19, 56,990 have been
discharged and 439 patients have died [11]. Modelled es-
timates showed that without robust response measures,
significantly large number of cases and deaths should
have been expected in Lagos and Nigeria [35–37]. This
would have had grave consequences on an already over-
whelmed health system, as has been reported for many
parts of Africa [38, 39]. Some of the response measures
that appear to have worked in stemming this tide in-
clude strict lockdowns, social distancing, including bans
on social and religious gatherings and restrictions of
intra- and inter-state movements [40]. Many countries
in sub-Saharan Africa were swift in deploying similar re-
sponse measures with similar successes although testing
capacities remain inadequate in the region [41].
The fact that the EOC was in place in Lagos State be-
fore the pandemic started helped to get an advance party
started as the virus reached Lagos. For example, the
management of the index case was immediately able to
commence at the IDH after laboratory confirmation and
contact tracing commenced immediately [42]. Similar
capacity for early diagnosis, swift isolation of cases and
prompt contact tracing were strong points of the 2014
EVD outbreak response that led to only eight mortalities
in Nigeria [10, 24]. At the time, the WHO described
Nigeria’s response as a “spectacular success story”, as the
total number of cases remained 19, with seven deaths
[43]. However, with COVID-19, the entirety of the EOC
was not in place and many members were just only
commissioned when the outbreak reached Lagos. Critic-
ally, community and religious leaders were only brought
on board after the committee had been established. It is
established that community and religious leaders are
huge influencers during outbreaks and play a pivotal role
in the whole-of-society pandemic readiness that the
WHO recommends for national responses [44, 45].
Health worker preparedness for COVID-19 in Lagos
focused on capacity building. However, since the onset
of the outbreak, health workers have faced several chal-
lenges including burnout from overwhelming workload,
with some advocating for inclusion of coping strategies
for optimizing mental health to be included in training
activities [46]. This is an area that could be improved to
ensure that frontline health workers are able to best pro-
vide the care that patients need in such crisis.
By partnering with private sector, Lagos was able to
minimize some of the cost that would have been in-
curred in responding to the outbreak. A key example of
this was the coming together of private sector collabora-
tors to form the Coalition Against COVID-19
(CACOVID) which is providing financing for immediate
purchase of medical supplies and the creation of isola-
tion centres for patient care. For instance, one of the pri-
vate sector collaborators was a financial institution,
which worked quickly to transform a stadium into a
110-bed isolation centre within five days in partnership
with Lagos State [47]. This is a huge strength for robust
response, as shown in China where strengthening of do-
mestic linkages was deemed key in responding to the
pandemic [38]. A systematic review on health security
capacities of 182 countries clearly showed that countries
vary widely in terms of their capacity to prevent, detect
and respond to outbreaks [15]. While governments in
high income countries have the financial mettle to fund
such capital-intensive structures, LMIC governments are
not in such strong positions. Therefore, private sector
support is indeed invaluable. Similar to Nigeria, Uganda,
South Africa and Ghana were able to manufacture low-
cost ventilators through public private partnerships.
Senegal’s cheap and rapid COVID-19 diagnostic test was
also enabled by the private sector [41].
Kapata and colleagues iterated that African countries
are on heightened alert to detect and isolate cases of
COVID-19 as substantial progress has been made since
the 2014 EVD outbreak with lessons learnt from previ-
ous and ongoing outbreaks in addition to significant in-
vestments into surveillance and preparedness [6]. Lagos
State recognised the risk and initiated planning for
COVID-19. While some of its preparedness were framed
based on lessons and experiences of the 2014 EVD out-
break, many were still being learnt on-the-go during the
ongoing pandemic. The establishment of Incident Com-
mand Centre for outbreak preparedness and response
activities has enabled the state to gather intelligence re-
ports daily as well as identify impending public health
threats and ensure that outbreak responses are well co-
ordinated and controlled [48]. For the 2014 EVD out-
break, the success recorded in its control were attributed
to the incident management approach with significant
support provided by the private sector and international
community [24]. However, with all countries including
donor countries facing significant challenges of their
own with COVID-19, the international community was
understandably not particularly a huge contributor in
the middle of the crisis. Indeed, private sector and per-
sonal philanthropic donations became important sources
of funding for health facilities during the pandemic [49].
A key part of the strategy that has been added now is
research. This has allowed for more targeted under-
standing of the pandemic and expansion of innovation
in responding to it. For example, a survey of the symp-
toms and signs of the first 2,184 PCR-confirmed
Abayomi et al. Globalization and Health           (2021) 17:79 Page 8 of 10
COVID-19 patients [50], provided evidence that shaped
training of health workers on identification of COVID-
19 cases.
Conclusion
As with the 2014 EVD outbreak, many anticipated as
“urban apocalypse” with COVID-19 infiltrating the
Lagos megacity [43]. This did not happen then and is
yet to happen with the ongoing pandemic. Indeed, pre-
paredness is a continuous process in which action, fund-
ing, partnerships, and political commitment at all levels
must be sustained. It relies on all stakeholders working
together effectively to plan, invest in, and implement pri-
ority actions. Like other geographical entities that have
had devastating outbreaks, Lagos State harnessed lessons
learned from the 2014 EVD outbreak, in what has been
referred to by some authors as the ‘Ebola legacy’ [51].
More importantly, many systems were already in place
to tackle any outbreaks that occurred post-2014. The
state’s response has also benefitted from strong leader-
ship, robust collaborations with national and inter-
national partners, new partnerships with private sector
and generous donations of altruistic individuals. How-
ever, the state needs to continue to expand its prepared-
ness to be more resilient and future proof to respond to
outbreaks like COVID-19, as it is clear that this is in-
deed the “new normal” for health systems. Looking be-
yond intra-state gains, lessons and identified best
practices from the past and present should be shared
with other states and countries.
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